Governor Ahmed Aliyu’s aggressive campaign against both the terrorists and their local collaborators represents an important shift in Sokoto State’s war against insecurity. His position recognizes an uncomfortable truth that terrorism has been sustained not only by heavily armed men in the forests and remote enclaves but also by the invisible support systems operating within the communities. Though these local collaborators are rarely part of the operations, yet they serve as a critical link in the chain that enables these criminal groups to survive and operate. They exploit their invisibility to serve as the eyes and ears of the insurgents.
Governor Aliyu’s decision to publicly confront this issue reflects a growing understanding that military operations alone cannot completely address a security challenge sustained by local intelligence and support networks. To appreciate the significance of this position, one must first understand why the activities of the collaborators is so consequential and central to the successful operations of the terrorists.
The operational intelligence they provide is lethal. On one hand, these informants help orchestrate precise target selection—they single out wealthy individuals for kidnappings, or identify influential traditional rulers and vocal youths who rally resistance for assassination. Furthermore, they constantly track the routines of local vigilante groups and monitor military movements; a phone call or text message warning the terrorists that a military convoy has left its base is all it takes for the terrorists to orchestrate devastating ambushes. Beyond intelligence gathering, the collaborators serve as part of the logistics structure that have sustained the operations of the terrorists. Apart from identifying targets, and alerting them on the movement of the military, they also help source for fuel for their motorcycles, food supplies, and medicine.
Their information gives these criminals operational advantages that security agencies have continued to struggle to overcome.
Alarmingly, this treacherous web of intelligence is unfortunately not confined to civilian informants alone; it reaches far into the very institutions tasked with ending the crisis. In a chilling audio recording in Hausa, the notorious bandit Kachalla Muhammadu openly admitted that rogue elements within the Nigerian Armed Forces actively serve as his personal informants. “The very military sent to eliminate me always provide me real-time data to aid my escape,” Muhammadu boasted. “I can never be captured or killed because their plans are compromised from within.”
Ultimately, defeating terrorism in this treacherous environment would rely far less on the firepower of the military and far more on breaking this deadly local intelligence loop. So long as these internal collaborators are allowed to run rampage, tipping off the enemy and compromising military operations from within, it will remain absolutely difficult for the security forces to achieve a decisive victory over them. And Governor Aliyu recognizes the fact that disrupting the operations of these local networks would significantly weaken the operational capacity of the terrorists. That defeating terrorism is not solely about confronting the terrorists; but it is also about dismantling the structures that have sustained them which has been the missing puzzle required to win the war against the terrorists.
The consequences of the collaboration extend far beyond the kidnappings and killings. Sokoto State’s economy, which relies heavily on agriculture, livestock and cross-border trade, continues to suffer enormously from the prolonged insecurity. Terrorist activities have disrupted farming activities, weakened commercial activities and reduced economic productivity in the affected communities. While a small number of individuals “profit” from their criminal activities through ransom negotiations, illegal trade or the purchase of rustled cattle, the broader society bears the devastating consequences of their actions. This economic devastation is precisely why Governor Aliyu is demanding a swift and decisive action against them as an end to the crisis. Targeting the collaborators is therefore beyond enhancing the security situation, but also an economic defense strategy that will restore livelihoods and the dignity of the people.
The humanitarian costs of the war have equally been very severe. Terrorist attacks on villages,roads and markets, coupled with illegal taxation and violence against rural populations, have triggered large-scale displacement of people. Thousands of residents have been forced to flee from their homes and suddenly transformed into Internally Displaced Persons(IDP’s). The Sokoto Government has consequently been compelled to provide them with humanitarian assistance and in the process diverted substantial resources toward emergency interventions. Recently the government commissioned 100 housing units for the IDP’s and laid the foundation stone for another 100 housing units. It also provided N500,000 start up capital for them.
Perhaps one of the most damaging effects of the collaborators actions has been the gradual destruction of social trust within the affected communities. Palpable fear thrives in the communities where residents suspect that anyone—a neighbor, trader or even acquaintance—may secretly be providing information to criminal groups. This no doubt has weakened social cohesion and undermined the communities’ ability to organize collective resistance against the insecurity.
Nigeria’s constitutional structure further complicates the security challenge. Under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, the primary purpose of government is explicitly defined as ensuring the security and welfare of the people. However, while state governors are often described as the Chief Security Officers of their states, the operational control of the armed forces remains vested in the President under Section 218 of the Constitution.
This contradiction has created very difficult realities for the 36 state governments. Though security remains largely a federal responsibility, states confronting the violence directly have increasingly been compelled to provide logistical support, construct military bases and contribute substantial financial resources for security operations. Sokoto State, like many others, has had to commit significant financial resources that might otherwise have been directed toward healthcare, education and other developmental projects.
While Governor Aliyu’s position that confronting the issue of the “local collaborators” is strategic in the war against the terrorists is correct, because it cuts straight to the root cause of why terrorism has persisted so stubbornly despite the heavy state investment, its long-term effectiveness will ultimately depend on the institutional structures that will be established to sustain it. Thankfully the governor is looking into passing the necessary legal frameworks to ensure swift and transparent prosecution of confirmed collaborators. Hopefully the severe penalties will serve as deterrents to others who might want to thread that path.
Communities often possess valuable information, but fear of violent reprisals frequently discourages them from providing the security agencies with the intelligence, so it is equally important that a secure and anonymous reporting mechanism that would allow residents to report suspected collaborators without fear of retaliation is put in place. Meanwhile the governor’s public campaign serves as a vital psychological reassurance, that will encourage them that the government has their back.
By elevating collaboration with terrorists into a serious criminal offense with severe consequences, the Governor Aliyu administration seeks to establish a powerful deterrent. Such a measure would fundamentally alter the risk-reward equation for potential informants and collaborators, sending a clear message that the state’s judicial and the security agencies will pursue those who facilitate terrorism with the same determination as the armed perpetrators themselves.
Community engagement must also remain central to the strategy. While some analysts argue that economic hardship, fear and desperation partly explain why some individuals become informants for terrorist groups, such factors cannot be justifications for actions that undermine the security of everyone. Addressing the issue of poverty, which the Sokoto State Government has done fantastically well in, restoring confidence in state institutions and strengthening local participation in the war will most certainly help reduce the conditions that allow the criminal groups to recruit the collaborators.
Again Sokoto State does not exist in isolation. It shares borders with Zamfara, Kebbi States, and the Niger Republic, while insecurity across the North – West remains highly fluid and interconnected,there hasn’t been a coordinated effort. Increasingly, the challenge is not limited to defeating the armed groups but also in dismantling the support systems and the intelligence networks that have enabled them to function. So actions taken by the Sokoto State should inevitably be taken by the others. Regional cooperation and intelligence sharing is increasingly important.
Even as Governor Aliyu continues to discharge his responsibilities through investments in security infrastructure, operational support and financial assistance to the security agencies, his drawing attention to the issue of the collaborators strikes at one of the most important dimensions of the crisis. Terrorism survives not merely through brutal violence but through networks of information, logistics and local support. While military operations remain indispensable, defeating the terrorists also depends on dismantling the structures that have enabled them to survive this long. In a nutshell security operations and intelligence disruption must therefore work together.
Governor Ahmed Aliyu therefore deserves credit for drawing attention to an uncomfortable but painful reality
By Emmanuel Ado
