Borrowing To The Brink Beyond The Balance Sheet: The Consequences of Unrestrained and Reckless Loans by The Nigerian Government.

Analyzing the concurrent policy strategy by the President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s [PBAT] Administration; of increasing borrowing and loans; taken, by the Federal Government, introducing aggressive tax reforms, and removing subsidies on essential commodities such as petrol and electricity, reveals a profound structural squeeze on the Nigerian economy and the purchasing power of the average Nigerian citizen.

Whilst; theoretically framed, by policymakers as necessary fiscal adjustments to correct historical distortions and expand government revenue, this convergence creates a high-risk policy paradox. Rather than stabilizing the economy, compounding these measures threatens a severe socio-economic contraction. Any sound Economist will profess this for free.

The primary disadvantage is a deepening fiscal trap that imposes a triple burden on citizens and the real economy. There is already higher living costs from subsidy removal, heavier immediate tax extraction, and a growing debt-service obligation that crowds out productive spending while ultimately requiring still more taxes or borrowing.

Nigeria’s public debt stock has risen sharply reaching roughly FRN=N=159 trillion as at the end of 2025, with federal debt alone nearly doubling since mid-2023. Debt servicing has escalated dramatically, total service payments hit approximately around FRN=N=15-16 trillion in 2025 with domestic service alone at FRN=N=8.6 trillion, frequently absorbing 60-70% or more of federal revenue and sometimes exceeding capital expenditure. Interest payments dominate, and much of the increase stems from naira depreciation, higher domestic rates, and accumulated obligations rather than purely new productive borrowing.

The Interaction with Subsidy Removal:

Fuel subsidy removal announced in May 2023, and subsequent electricity tariff adjustments produced large claimed fiscal savings; the government figures cite FRN=N=15.8 trillion in resources mobilised for the Federation through the end of 2025.

Fuel Pump prices rose several-fold from FRN=N=185 to FRN=N=240 per litre pre-removal to averages well above FRN=N=1,000.00K, in later periods, transport and food costs surged, and hyper-inflation accelerated. Electricity subsidies were also reduced via targeted tariff hikes.

These savings so far have not translated into durable fiscal space or broad relief. Significant portions have been absorbed by higher debt-service costs especially external service swollen by the depreciation of the Nigerian Naira; [FRN=N=], minimum wage adjustments, residual electricity support, and other outlays.

The structural consequences of the unrestrained borrowing by the Federal Government of Nigeria; [FGN], which Nigeria really can no longer afford taking out further colossal loans as it has a deepening toll on Nigeria’s overall economic wellbeing as a country. And it is invariably mortgaging our tomorrow and indeed the Nigerian child yet unborn, thereby compromising Nigeria’s future as a whole.

It seems the PBAT led FGN; does not understand the true cost of Nigeria’s loan spree in terms of debt servicing, starving national growth and stagnating development. The dangerous illusion of Nigeria’s debt-driven economy is that Nigeria is now a Nation-on-Credit, which is choking Nigeria’s potential as an economic world power. An objective assessment of Nigeria’s public debt indicates fiscal recklessness and macro-economic vulnerability.

Meanwhile; poverty metrics have worsened, capacity utilisation in manufacturing has faced pressure from elevated energy costs, and household purchasing power has been eroded. The reform reduced one major fiscal leak but did not eliminate the underlying revenue shortfall or the inherited debt overhang; borrowing has continued, in part to manage transition costs and service existing obligations.

Interaction with New and Expanded Taxes:

The 2025 Tax Reform Acts; [Nigeria Tax Act and related legislation] have introduced or consolidated measures including a 4% Development Levy on assessable profits; replacing several prior levies, capital gains tax has been raised to 30% for companies, more progressive personal income tax bands with a higher top rate, and strengthened administration and compliance mechanisms. Small companies receive relief, but medium and large firms, higher earners, and certain transactions now face increased effective burdens.

These taxes arrive after citizens and businesses have already absorbed sharp cost-of-living increases from subsidy removal and currency adjustment. The combination reduces disposable income and raises operating costs at a time when inflation remains hyper-elevated and real incomes have been compressed and shrunken. Revenue gains from better collection are real but occur against a backdrop in which a large share of any incremental revenue is pre-committed to debt service rather than new public projects, goods or targeted relief.

Core Critical Disadvantages:

I.          Crowding out of development spending: When debt service routinely exceeds or approaches capital budgets and consumes the bulk of revenue, resources for infrastructure, health, education, and security shrink. This undermines the very growth and development that would make debt sustainable.

II.         Intergenerational transfer and debt trap risk: New borrowing [domestic and external] adds to the stock that future tax-payers must service. High domestic interest rates also crowd out private credit. If revenue growth continues to lag debt-service growth, the government risks borrowing primarily to service prior debt, becoming a classic trap.

III.       Regressive incidence and social strain: Subsidy removal hits transport, food, and energy costs hardest for lower-income and middle-income households. New or higher taxes [even if progressive on paper] compound the squeeze when formal employment and formal-sector activity are limited. Rising poverty and reduced consumption weaken domestic demand and can fuel social tension.

IV.       Distortion of incentives and private investment: Higher effective tax rates, elevated energy costs, and scarce, expensive credit discourage expansion, formalisation, and long-term investment. Manufacturing energy intensity and costs have raised post-subsidy removal in some analyses, with employment and utilisation effects.

V.        Limited credibility of the reform narrative: Citizens experience immediate pain [higher prices and taxes] while the promised dividend [better services, infrastructure, and or lower future burdens] are delayed or diluted by debt service. This erodes trust and raises the political cost of further necessary adjustments.

VI.       Macro vulnerability: Heavy domestic borrowing sustains high interest rates; external obligations expose the budget to exchange-rate shocks. Debt service to revenue ratios remain far above regional peer or sustainability benchmarks, leaving little buffer for shocks.

The central disadvantage is a self-reinforcing fiscal and social trap, in that the FGN is simultaneously raising the cost-of-living through subsidy removal, extracting more revenue through new and expanded taxes, and locking in a growing claim on future revenue through continued heavy borrowing. This combination imposes a triple burden on citizens and the real economy while crowding out the productive spending that would make the debt sustainable.

Nigeria’s total public debt has risen sharply, reaching approximately FRN=N=159 trillion by the end of 2025. Federal debt alone nearly doubled in the three years after 2023. Debt service payments climbed to around FRN=N=15-16 trillion in 2025, with domestic debt service alone jumping to FRN=N=8.6 trillion.

In multiple periods, debt service has absorbed 60-70 per-cent or more of federally retained revenue and has exceeded capital expenditure. Interest payments dominate these outlays. Much of the increase reflects Nigerian Naira [FRN=N=] depreciation, elevated domestic interest rates, and the accumulated stock rather than purely new high-return investment. When such a large; share of revenue is pre-committed to creditors, fiscal space for infrastructure, health, education, and security shrinks or disappears.

1. The Policy Paradox: Double-Taxing a Squeezed Populace:

The PBAT administration’s rationale for removing subsidies and expanding taxes was ostensibly to free up fiscal space and reduce the heavy reliance on debt. However, continuing to borrow heavily alongside these measures negates their primary justification.

I.        The Revenue Trap: Subsidies were removed and taxes introduced under the banner of no more money to borrow. Yet, public debt profiles continue to expand. This signals to citizens and international markets that the massive domestic sacrifices [higher costs of fuel, food, and transport] are not translating into fiscal prudence or debt reduction, but are instead being absorbed by recurrent government expenditure and debt servicing obligations.

II.     Shrinking Disposable Incomes: Nigerian Citizens face a triple threat; their purchasing power is decimated by hyper-inflation caused by subsidy removal, their disposable income is further eroded by new or adjusted taxes [VAT, Stamp Duties, Bank Charges, Electricity Band Bills, and Ground Rent, etc.], and they receive little to no cushioning because state funds are locked into servicing past and current debt.

2. Comprehensive Disadvantages of the Triad Strategy:

A. The Destructive Feedback Loop of Borrowing and Inflation:

I.        Debt Servicing Dominance: A massive share of government revenue goes toward debt servicing. When the government borrows more, especially through high-yield domestic instruments or expensive external loans, it crowds out private sector credit and drives up interest rates.

II.     Monetary Policy Conflict: To combat the inflation triggered by subsidy removal and currency devaluation, the Central Bank of Nigeria, often raises interest rates. Simultaneously, government borrowing keeps yields high. This chokes private sector borrowing, halts industrial expansion, and triggers job losses, creating a stagflationary environment.

B. Regressive Taxation on a Vulnerable Population:

I.        Crushing the Informal Sector: New taxes and aggressive tax collection mechanisms heavily target consumption and transactions [e.g., VAT and electronic bank levies]. In an economy where over 60% of the population operates in the informal sector, these are regressive taxes. The government takes a much larger percentage of a low-income earner’s income compared to a high-income earner.

II.     Stifling Business Survival: Manufacturers and SMEs are already dealing with astronomical electricity tariffs [post-subsidy/band-tariff adjustments] and high logistics costs due to petroleum pricing, are burdened with multiple taxation layers from federal, state, and local agencies. These forces businesses to either fold up or pass exorbitant costs onto an already impoverished consumer base.

C. The Demand-Side Crisis [Economic Stagnation]:

I.        Demolition of Aggregate Demand: Economic growth relies on consumer spending. By simultaneously removing subsidies [which spikes transport, food, and energy costs] and levying more taxes, the government systematically destroys aggregate demand.

II.     The Poverty Spiral: When citizens spend 70% to 80% of their income merely on basic survival [food and transportation], they stop spending on education, healthcare, and discretionary goods. This shrinks the market size for local industries, leading to lower production, reduced tax compliance over time due to business failures, and deeper national poverty.

D. Moral Hazard and Loss of Social Contract:

I.        Erosion of Trust: Successful economic reforms require a strong social contract; citizens must trust that short-term pain will yield long-term infrastructure and public goods and services. When the populace experiences acute suffering from subsidy removal and heavy taxation, yet reads about grand government borrowing, bloated public office expenditures, and unfulfilled palliatives, trust collapses.

II.     Industrial Unrest and Brain Drain: The cumulative effect of these policies triggers intense social friction, frequent labour strikes, and a mass exodus of skilled professionals, and the countries youth [the “Japa” syndrome] and multinational corporations seeking stable operating environments elsewhere in Africa.

How the Three Policy Pillars Matrix Interlock Negatively:

I.                    The intended goal of the More Borrowing Policy is to bridge infrastructural and budgetary deficits. However the actual disadvantageous outcome is that it inflates debt servicing costs, crowds out private sector credit, and increases the macroeconomic vulnerability.

II.                 The intended goal of the Subsidy Removal Policy is to free-up public funds and stop economic rent-seeking. However the actual disadvantageous outcome is that it triggers an immediate cost-of-living crisis, spiking inflation across all sectors.

III.               The intended goal of the New Taxes Policy is to broaden the non-oil revenue base. However the actual disadvantageous outcome is that it squeezes the informal sector, chokes the struggling SMEs, and heavily punishes the impoverished consumers; i.e. the average Nigerian citizen.

Conclusion:

In reality it is necessary for Governments to borrow money, for infrastructural developments and budgetary deficiencies, however in the case of Nigeria, these loans are not used for the purposes they were collected for, rather the said loans are diverted, converted and misappropriated to private and personal interested ventures and accounts.

The fundamental flaw in combining heavy borrowing with aggressive taxation and total subsidy removal is that it squeezes a dry sponge. By failing to first curb extravagant governance costs, corruption and structurally diversify productive sectors, the PBAT led government risks driving the Nigerian economy into a deeper debt-poverty trap. Sustainable fiscal consolidation requires cutting waste in governance and curtailing corruption before imposing sacrifices on a populace that has already reached its breaking point.

In essence, continued colossal borrowing alongside subsidy removal and tax expansion converts short-term fiscal stabilisation into a longer-term burden. Nigerians pay more now through prices and taxes, while a large and growing claim on future revenue is locked in for creditors.

The sustainable path requires not merely more revenue or less subsidy, but stricter prioritisation of borrowing for high-return capital projects, stronger expenditure control, and faster non-oil revenue mobilisation that demonstrably expands the productive base rather than merely servicing the existing stock. Without that discipline, the combination amplifies hardship without delivering commensurate growth and development gains.

After all the loans taken out and borrowing to the brink does the Nigerian balance sheet add up? Does Nigeria really need these loans?

By Mohammed I. TSAV Esq.

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